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Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were 
undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. 
Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to 
Zagreb’s democratic shortcomings, but partly also due to competing visions of post-Cold War 
Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases rooted in Croatia’s and Britain’s conflicting policies 
during Yugoslavia’s breakup and wars. Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity 
for the two countries to leave the burdens of their past behind, since Zagreb and London had similar 
preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Brexit changed everything. Croatia’s 
future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the 
evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration.
KEY WORDS:
Croatia, United Kingdom, foreign relations, European Union
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
6
The contrast between Croatia’s standing in the international system today 
and its position in January 1992, when it was finally recognised by the 
member states of the European Community, could not be starker. Two and 
a half decades ago Croatia won its independence after barely surviving 
a brutal war that left thousands of its citizens dead, several hundred 
thousand homeless, and a third of its territory under occupation. Although 
internationally recognised, its territorial integrity was far from secured. 
Moreover, its relations with most European and world powers – partly on 
account of its pursuit of independence, and partly on account of these 
powers’ policies during the war – were troublingly acrimonious. Twenty-
five years ago, Croatia was attempting to ride the wave of international 
system changes in order to extricate itself from a troublesome regional 
status quo. Today, in the midst of a new round of tectonic shifts in the 
international system, Croatia is hardly keen to alter the regional or larger 
European status quo. It is a country at peace with its neighbours (despite 
frequent, though comparatively minor, tensions), desperate to maintain 
the protection it receives through the membership of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU).
Over the course of the same two and a half decades, the United Kingdom 
(UK) went through a completely opposite transformation of its standing in 
the international system. At the time of the end of the Cold War, Britain 
was engaged in a profound debate regarding its foreign policy strategy 
and the shift in its geopolitical position. The end of the Soviet threat, the 
reunification of Germany, and the process of deepening of European 
integration left Britain’s political class torn over the redefinition of Britain’s 
international priorities. Was Britain supposed to jump behind the steering 
wheel of European integration – to be “at the heart of Europe”, as the newly 
installed Prime Minister John Major exclaimed in November 1990 (Smith, G. 
1992: 155) – or was it to remain on its side-lines? What role was Britain’s 
“special relationship” with the United States (US) to play in its positioning 
in the budding EU? Considering the change in America’s perception of 
Europe and the geopolitical transformation of the continent, was Britain 
on the verge of losing to a reunited Germany the position of the “pivot of 
the West” and a bridge between the US and Europe, and instead turning 
into “England under Henry VIII: a kingdom on the edge of a European 
system, attempting both to play a part in continental politics and to assert 
its independence of continental constraints” (Wallace 1992: 424)?
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Although the British political class welcomed these questions with 
trepidation, a new status quo in Europe – that was highly beneficial to the 
UK – developed rather quickly. London was at the forefront of shaping 
new European political and security structures, all the while building on 
its special relationship with Washington, and maintaining its connections 
throughout its former Empire (Jović 2007). Then, however, came Brexit. 
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee under Margaret Thatcher 
and John Major, Sir Percy Cradock, thought that one of the greatest 
errors of modern British foreign policy was treating Europe “[not] as if it 
was truly our future, rather as if it was a threat, or an adversary” (Cradock 
1997: 207). That error, simmering on and under the surface of British 
politics for five decades, materialised in the summer of 2016 into a de 
facto capture of the ruling Conservative Party by its Eurosceptic wing and 
the consequent departure of the UK from the EU after a bitterly fought 
and extremely divisive referendum campaign. From one of the pillars of 
European political and economic security, Britain suddenly turned into 
one of the largest threats to Europe’s geopolitical status quo. The role 
reversal between Britain and Croatia, if one compares their positions 
toward Europe’s present and future, was complete. 
Such a clear disparity in the direction and nature of change in the 
international positions of Croatia and Britain over the past twenty-five 
years, coupled with Britain’s traditionally low interest in Eastern Europe, 
could lead us to conclude that relations between the two countries during 
this period were at best inconsequential. The obvious disproportion in their 
power capabilities may also lead us to conclude that their relations could 
only have been unidirectional: that is, Croatia could only have been an 
object of British foreign policy, never a truly independent subject in the 
interaction between the two countries, no matter the obvious power 
imbalance. Both of those conclusions, however, would be incorrect. 
The story of relations between Croatia and Britain is by no means a thin 
volume depicting the powerless simply adjusting to the wishes of the 
powerful. In the two and a half decades of its independence, Croatia 
faced many foreign policy challenges: from securing its territorial integrity 
to establishing functional relations with its neighbours and positioning 
itself firmly within the political, economic, and security structures of the EU 
and NATO. Arguably no other country outside of Southeast Europe (SEE) 
created more obstacles for Croatia in the completion of those foreign 
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policy challenges than Britain. Considering the extraordinary changes 
in Europe’s political architecture that we are currently witnessing, it is 
time to take stock of the evolution of the relations between these two 
countries. This article traces Croatia’s relations with the UK from its struggle 
for independence in the early 1990s until the present day, with particular 
attention devoted to the one intervening variable without which those 
relations could not be properly understood: the European Union. The 
article does that in the hope of better understanding the future of not only 
relations between these two countries, but also of the European project 
and the UK’s policies toward its continued development.
The “original sin”: Britain, Croatia and the breakup 
of Yugoslavia
Britain’s policy toward the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, 
later labelled by Brendan Simms (2002) as Britain’s “unfinest hour”, was 
founded upon two closely related dynamics from the late 1980s: 1) London’s 
devotion to the continuing existence of the Yugoslav federation, and 2) the 
consequent blind spot for the campaign of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia 
for control over a recentralized Yugoslavia. The response of the Foreign 
Office to Ambassador Peter Hall’s distressed 1989 and 1990 reports about 
the harmful consequences of Milošević’s campaign was that “they really 
would much prefer it not to be happening” and that Yugoslavia simply 
had to remain united (Hall 2005). This position of the Foreign Office was 
in no way exceptional. During this period, all Western powers – including 
(West) Germany which did not deviate from the mainstream until real war 
began in the summer of 1991 – strongly believed not only that the Yugoslav 
republics had to stick together, but also that they would politically and 
economically benefit from steady centralisation. This policy preference 
essentially implied that the Western powers supported Milošević and 
not Yugoslavia’s northwest republics in the constitutional debates which 
consumed the federation’s political landscape in the years leading up 
to war. It also matched the West’s larger policy preference regarding 
the preservation of stability in Eastern Europe. As the Foreign Secretary 
Douglas Hurd later put it, “We had no strategic interest in the Balkans, no 
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commercial interest, no selfish interest at all. We simply wished that quiet 
should return” (Hurd 2005). 
Hurd’s image of Britain simply wishing for “quiet” to return to a region in 
which it had no particular strategic interests is, of course, only one part 
of the story. The larger and by far the more interesting part was Britain’s 
strong policy activism in pursuit of that “quiet” once real war came to 
Slovenia and – to a far greater extent – Croatia: Whitehall’s rejection of 
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s declarations of independence; its equivocation 
in condemning the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) use of force; its dogged 
opposition to any form of international military intervention – even in the 
most benign form of ceasefire monitors; its support for an arms embargo 
which cemented the vast military supremacy of Serbia and its allies 
for years to come; its determined efforts to halt the recognition of the 
Yugoslav republics; its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Croatia 
for months after its recognition; and, last but not least, the neo-colonial 
abuse of historical imagery by a number of its diplomats and foreign 
policy makers who argued that the Yugoslav conflicts were steeped in the 
region’s “ancient hatreds” (Glaurdić 2011). Contemporary perceptions of 
Croatia among British foreign policy makers and of Britain among their 
Croatian counterparts were decisively shaped during those first months 
of Croatia’s struggle for independence – and neither country came out 
looking good. Croatia, largely due to its president Franjo Tuđman and his 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), was seen in Whitehall as the nationalist-
run destroyer of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain was seen in Zagreb not only 
as the country protective of Milošević’s Serbia and hostile to Croatia’s 
independence, but also blind to the plight of a series of Croatian towns 
and villages falling prey to the onslaught of Belgrade’s military machinery.
What could explain the content of Britain’s activism during this period? 
More than a century ago Lord Salisbury remarked that “the commonest 
error in politics [is] sticking to the carcasses of dead policies” (Hill 1988: 
26). London’s decision to stick to the policy of keeping Yugoslavia united 
even after the troubled federation’s descent into mayhem does have 
some explanatory power, though probably only when it comes to the 
earlier stages of the war in Croatia. The fact that a different approach 
was eventually advocated by a recently reunited Germany also did not 
help. To say that Britain was wary of a new European order dominated by 
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Germany would be an understatement (Glaurdić 2011). Although London 
(as well as Paris) to a great extent based its policy toward Yugoslavia 
on the considerations of larger European developments at the time, 
this line of argumentation also has its limits. A more useful interpretation 
may be the one offered by James Gow who saw Britain’s “pusillanimous 
realism” decisively contributing to the Western “triumph of the lack of 
will” to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav conflicts (Gow 1997: 174-183). 
According to this view, London (and, to varying levels, other Western 
capitals) accepted the (im)balance of power on the ground in former 
Yugoslavia because it did not wish to jeopardise its own post-Cold War 
“peace dividend” by getting embroiled in a Balkan war.
This argument certainly does have its logical appeal. Nevertheless, it is 
flawed for several reasons. First, it implicitly suggests that Britain was little 
more than a troubled observer of what was happening in Yugoslavia 
when, in fact, it was a highly proactive participant with direct and indirect 
influence on the decisions of the Yugoslav protagonists. Second, the “lack 
of will” argument also serves to mask the serious clash of wills among the 
Western powers to which Britain made a decisive contribution, particularly 
when it comes to its relations with reunited Germany, but later also with the 
US under the Clinton administration. This clash of wills was not only centred 
on the question of military intervention, but was concerned with virtually 
every aspect of the West’s policy – military or diplomatic. And third, the 
“lack of will” argument fails to reveal the extent to which British policy 
makers were committed to actively warping the interpretation of what 
was happening on the ground to build a case for their preferred policies. 
In order to dissuade the various members of the international community 
– as well as many in the British public, press, and politics – who were calling 
for a forceful intervention against Serbian aggression, the case had to be 
made not only that the origins of the Yugoslav conflict were “ancient”, 
but also that all parties were equally guilty. Indeed, no one contributed 
more to the distorting campaign of moral relativism and the equivalence 
of guilt in Western perceptions of Yugoslav conflicts than British foreign 
policy makers and diplomats (Conversi 1996). As the Chairman of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia and the former foreign secretary, Lord 
Carrington, succinctly put it, the Yugoslavs were “all impossible people… 
all as bad as each other, and there are just more Serbs” (Simms 2002: 
17). This was realism alright, but it was realism which was fully aware of its 
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consequences for the situation on the ground, and which found those 
consequences acceptable. As one British journalist observed at the time 
of the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995, “Ministers don’t say so in public, 
but the fundamental British view remains that only a strong Serbia can 
ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans” (ibid.: 12). If there was a 
carcass of dead policies that London stuck to over the years in the region 
of former Yugoslavia – then this was it.
The triumph of realism: Britain, Croatia and the 
Bosnian war
British realpolitik reached its climax during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(BiH). In spite of the obvious escalation of preparations for war by the 
Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsors, the European Community 
– decisively led by Britain – did nothing to halt the aggression before it 
happened. Instead, it withheld the international recognition of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in early 1992 and used the Serb military threats to force the 
BiH government to accept a deal for the de facto ethnic partition of its 
country. What is worst, this approach did not change even once the Serb 
military threats materialised in the form of ethnic cleansing and genocide 
throughout the summer of 1992. Lord Carrington continued to insist that 
“Peace will not come to Bosnia until there is a de facto partition”. The 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hogg, 
told the BiH government, “There is no cavalry over the hill. There is no 
international force coming to stop this” (ibid.: 20, 30). And Douglas Hurd 
argued against the repeal of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by suggesting that the West should not be creating a “level killing field”. 
The obvious implication was that an uneven killing field was preferable 
(Almond 1994: 321).
Western foreign policy makers actively worked to limit their involvement 
and publicly recast the conflict as an unfortunate but intractable civil war. 
In this effort, they were determinedly led by the administration of John Major 
in London which, together with the administration of François Mitterrand in 
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Paris, took the reins of the Western military and diplomatic effort in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Britain was, thus, instrumental in framing the UN intervention 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina only in humanitarian terms – first as assistance in 
opening the Sarajevo airport for flights carrying humanitarian aid, then as 
protection for UNHCR convoys throughout the country, and finally (and 
extremely reluctantly) as ceasefire monitors and a quasi-protective force 
in Bosnia’s five “safe areas”. Britain also maintained strong influence on 
the shape of the various peace plans which were negotiated during the 
war – first through Lord Carrington; then through another former Foreign 
Secretary, David Owen, who in August 1992 succeeded Carrington as 
the EU co-chairman of the Conference for the Former Yugoslavia; and 
finally, through the work of the Contact Group (the UK, the US, France, 
Russia, Germany). Unsurprisingly, all of these peace plans were based 
on the deeply flawed principle of ethnic territorialisation which ultimately 
rewarded land grab through violence and ethnic cleansing (Toal and 
Dahlman 2011), and which formed the crux of Britain’s policy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As Douglas Hogg explained in his 1994 contribution to 
the Royal United Services Institute Journal, the government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina “have to recognize defeat when it stares them in the face, 
that land has been seized by force, and that there has to be a degree of 
acceptance of that fact… The other thing that they must accept is that 
the military option has to be abandoned”. This, he wrote, was a “major 
objective” of British policy (Hogg 1994: 16).
The interaction between Britain and Croatia when it comes to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a subject of great controversy – which is perhaps 
not a great surprise, considering that the policies of both countries during 
the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain extremely controversial as well. 
Britain’s preference for ethnic territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
closely mirrored the preferences of Croatia’s president Franjo Tuđman 
and his proxies in the leadership of the BiH Croats; and the Vance-Owen 
and the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans of 1993 were arguably territorially 
favourable to the Croats (Hodge 2008: 412-413). The perverse incentives 
of these plans for exclusionary policies by the parties on the ground, as 
well as the huge influx of Bosniak refugees into Croat-controlled areas 
in Central Bosnia, however, directly led to the Croat-Bosniak conflict of 
1993-1994 which resulted in a near catastrophe for the BiH Croats and 
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Croatia itself. Significant territories were lost to the numerically superior 
and Bosniak-dominated Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and the efforts of British foreign policy makers and diplomats to equalise 
Croatia’s and Serbia’s roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified. London 
also led the calls for sanctions on Croatia (Hodge 2006: 66-67). Zagreb 
managed to avoid such a fate by consenting to the US-brokered 1994 
Washington Agreement which led to the formation of a Bosniak-Croat 
federation, but Britain’s policy saw little change in the last year and a half 
of the Bosnian war. Its foreign policy makers succeeded in suppressing 
mounting calls for international intervention, and its diplomats were 
instrumental in making sure that the Contact Group’s peace plan, as well 
as the Dayton Agreement which finally ended the war awarded 49% of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Serbs (ibid.: 106-126). Even after it became 
clear that the fall of Srebrenica was followed by a genocidal massacre of 
thousands of Bosniak men and boys, and that a similar fate likely awaited 
the “safe area” of Bihać which was surrounded and under heavy attack, 
Britain was adamant there would be no international action to prevent 
that from happening (Freedland 1995).
The “new original sin”: Operation Storm and the 
end of the Croatian war
Bihać, however, avoided Srebrenica’s fate, largely thanks to Croatia’s 
forces whose Operation Storm in August 1995 not only succeeded in 
ending the blockade of this “safe area”, but also in regaining nearly 
all of Croatia’s previously occupied territory by defeating the so-called 
“Republic of Serb Krajina”. Operation Storm was a militarily successful four-
day campaign which practically ended the war in Croatia and caused 
a complete shift of balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly led to the 
end of the war there as well. The exodus of 150,000-200,000 Krajina Serbs, 
and the crimes of looting, arson, and murder of several hundred civilians 
who remained, also, however, sullied Croatia’s international image and 
proved an enormous political and economic burden for years to come.
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Britain’s response to Operation Storm was extremely negative even 
before the crimes – which took place over the course of several weeks 
of lawless interregnum after the operation – became public. The reaction 
of Defence Secretary Michael Portillo on 7 August 1995 – the last day of 
the operation – was a perfect case in point. He labelled Operation Storm 
“ethnic cleansing” and expressed the view that “a conclusion which is 
based on shifting hundreds of thousands of people and in the process 
killing tens of thousands more is just not an acceptable way of moving 
towards a peace settlement.” Aside from grossly inflating the numbers 
of victims, Portillo also shed a revealing light on Britain’s view of Croatia’s 
internationally recognized borders: “The difficulty with this conflict has 
always been to try and get more than one party to agree that it is in their 
interests to negotiate a peace rather than just to seize more and more 
territory.” His opinion on the aims of the international community was no less 
illuminating: “The object of international efforts must be to bring the parties 
to the negotiating table, to establish a map, to establish a ceasefire and 
then allow the UN to police that ceasefire and continue its humanitarian 
work” (Wintour 1995). Croatia was chastised for allegedly “killing tens 
of thousands” of people and trying “to seize more and more territory”. 
Meanwhile, the preferred actions of the international community were 
in fact supposed to reinforce exactly such behaviour because Croatia’s 
shape on the map – despite its internationally recognised borders – was 
apparently still to be established.
To say that Operation Storm and the nature of the end of the war in Croatia 
became a bone of contention between London and Zagreb would be an 
understatement. Whereas Croatia’s pursuit of independence and Britain’s 
strong opposition to it were the two countries’ “original sins” in their mutual 
perceptions of each other, the character of Croatia’s victory in its war for 
independence and Britain’s strong insistence on criminalising that victory 
over the course of the next decade and a half became the “new original 
sins” in the relations between the two countries. Britain’s foreign policy 
makers and diplomats insisted not only on Croatia’s judicial prosecution of 
those guilty of crimes against Serb civilians and on the enforcement of the 
Serb refugees’ right to return; but also on the de facto revision of Croatia’s 
perception of its victory into an element of a “joint criminal enterprise” of 




o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
15
Postwar acrimony: Tudman and regional integration
Tuđman’s basking in the glow of victory over the Krajina Serbs was short-
lived. Within months his government was placed under strong international 
pressure which was decisively shaped and driven by London. One of the 
first causes of that pressure concerned the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accords which were agreed to in November 1995. In many ways, 
Dayton was an extension of the Contact Group peace plan which 
divided Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Bosniak-Croat Federation 
and the Serb entity with the ratio 51:49. As was the case throughout the 
Bosnian war and with the various earlier iterations of Western peace plans, 
Tuđman was cooperative at Dayton and accepted the agreement’s 
principal tenets without much fuss. Soon after the Accords were signed, 
however, he realised that his strategic goals were not going to be fulfilled 
on the ground. Rather than a loosely organised collection of ethnically 
defined cantons with significant self-rule that Tuđman believed it to be, 
the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to become an entity with strong central 
prerogatives and thus inevitably dominated by the numerically superior 
Bosniak community. This led to a serious conflict between the BiH Croats 
and Tuđman on one side, and the international mediators in Bosnia-
Herzegovina on the other – conflict which ensued, with varying levels of 
intensity, throughout the rest of Tuđman’s presidency.
The principal arena of conflict was the city of Mostar, split during the 
Bosniak-Croat conflict into two ethnically defined halves. The Dayton 
Agreement gave a new impetus to the EU efforts of unifying the city, but 
the local Croats strongly objected to a series of provisions for administrative 
reorganisation, joint policing, return of refugees, and freedom of 
movement between the two parts. Tuđman and his government supported 
their obstinacy, but with serious repercussions for Croatia’s international 
position. As one EU diplomat told the Guardian in January 1996, “At one 
time Tuđman had friends in high places in some member states. There 
was talk of Croatia eventually joining the EU. That is completely out of the 
question now” (Palmer 1996). Throughout the first half of 1996, Tuđman 
remained dismissive of the EU’s Mostar efforts, but by early August of that 
year he had to relent. What seemed to seal the deal was the US insistence 
that, if the Bosniak-Croat Federation was to fall apart because of Tuđman, 
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Croatia was to become an international pariah, as well as calls by UK 
officials in London and Mostar for possible economic sanctions on Croatia 
(Barber 1996; Borger 1996).
This pattern of interaction between the West and post-war Croatia, with 
strenuous conflicts and threats of sanctions, was not limited to the issue 
of implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The domestic policies of the Tuđman government garnered even more 
criticism from international circles: from Tuđman’s unwillingness to accept 
the opposition victory in the local elections in Zagreb to his regime’s 
treatment of the media. In May 1996, the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe delayed Croatia’s accession to that organisation 
despite previous approval by the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly 
– the first time this happened in the organization’s history. Croatia was 
also asked to lift its barriers to the return of Serb refugees and to improve 
its cooperation with the newly proactive International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Guardian 1996). Although Croatia was 
officially admitted to the Council of Europe later that autumn, very little 
progress was made on any of those fronts. Its internal political environment 
and its relations with the international community thus continued to be 
dominated by public protests against the government, international 
threats and reprimands, and increasing obstinacy by Tuđman and the 
HDZ throughout 1996 and 1997. Relations turned particularly sour with 
London, as the British officials once again called for sanctions on Zagreb 
and the British media had a field day equalising Tuđman with Slobodan 
Milošević (Glenny 1996; Traynor 1996).
Croatia’s hopes for a change in Britain’s approach got a boost in May 1997, 
with the electoral victory of Tony Blair and the Labour Party. The pro-Serb 
bias of the Conservatives was a broadly accepted fact of Britain’s political 
life, repeatedly confirmed during the war and once again in the summer 
of 1996 when the former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and the former 
Foreign Office Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones, in their capacities 
as high-ranking officials of NatWest Markets, concluded a highly lucrative 
business deal with the Milošević regime for the sale of Serbian Telecom 
(Hodge 2006: 127-128). This Conservative establishment, which decisively 
crafted Britain’s and Europe’s policy toward the breakup of Yugoslavia 
and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was decimated at the 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
17
polls, with both the Defense Secretary Michael Portillo and the Foreign 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind – two prominent voices in favour of a tough 
line against Zagreb – losing their parliamentary seats. Hopes for a new 
approach increased further when the British Special Air Service (SAS) units 
made arrests of two Bosnian Serbs under sealed ICTY indictment that July, 
thus signalling London’s shift away from Britain’s earlier policy in the region.
Zagreb’s hopes were, however, very soon dashed. The visit of the new 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the region in late July 1997 made it clear 
that nothing substantive really changed in London’s view of the situation on 
the ground. Cook reserved equal blame for all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
for the failure to implement the Dayton Agreement – although the Serbian 
entity was unanimously identified by the international organisations in BiH 
as the overwhelming violator of the Agreement. He also endorsed Biljana 
Plavšić – one of the chief ideologues and leaders of the Bosnian Serb war 
effort – in her local power struggles and he publicly promised there would 
be no more arrests for war crimes in the British-controlled sector of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ibid.: 140-143). More importantly, during his visit to Zagreb, 
Cook announced that Britain had blocked an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) loan to Croatia and he rebuffed Tuđman’s request for support 
of Croatia’s closer association with the EU. According to press reports, 
Cook told Tuđman that “Britain saw ‘no prospect’ of Croatia becoming a 
member of the EU in the foreseeable future” (Binyon 1997).
Such a rigid stance by the Foreign Secretary came as somewhat of a 
surprise to Zagreb not only because of hopes that Labour would bring a 
different approach to Britain’s policy in Southeast Europe, but also because 
of the new government’s more proactive stance regarding EU eastward 
expansion. Tony Blair came to office believing that “We cannot shape 
Europe unless we matter in Europe” (Smith, J. 2005: 708). And one way of 
mattering in Europe was pushing forward a real agenda for enlargement. 
Crucially, this agenda for enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) was to be based on the principle of individual evaluation of each 
candidate country’s own merits. Britain was against the across-the-board 
beginning of negotiations with all CEE prospective candidates and strongly 
believed in bilateralism as the guiding principle in relations between the EU 
and the CEE states (Lippert 2001: 11). This raised Croatia’s expectations 
of London’s support because of Zagreb’s extreme irritation with the EU’s 
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Regional Approach policy toward Southeast Europe which bundled 
Croatia together with FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania, and which was introduced in 1996.
The implication of this policy was that the EU was in Southeast Europe 
making regional cooperation into an element of its conditionality for 
future membership (Bechev 2006: 31). Tuđman’s reaction to such a policy 
was obviously very negative. He opposed it partly on pragmatic grounds 
that the rest of the region – far less economically developed – was to 
hold Croatia back on its road to the EU. Even more so, he opposed it 
on political (or even ideological) grounds because he saw the EU 
Regional Approach as an attempt to rebuild some form of a regional 
superstructure akin to former Yugoslavia. To Tuđman’s disappointment, 
the new British government not only rebuffed his request for support of 
Croatia’s closer integration with the EU, but it also – in contrast to its policy 
toward CEE – backed the EU Regional Approach for Southeast Europe. 
Tuđman’s response was characteristically defiant. He initiated the process 
of constitutional changes in Croatia and had an amendment inserted 
prohibiting “the initiation of a process of association of the Republic of 
Croatia into unions with other states which could lead to the restoration 
of the Yugoslav state community or the formation of a Balkan state 
community in any form” (Zastupnički dom 1997).
The last two years of Tuđman’s presidency were thus marked by tense 
relations with the international community; pressures and threats regarding 
Croatia’s record on human rights, refugee return, implementation of the 
Dayton Agreement, cooperation with the ICTY, and regional integration; 
and, as a result, little or no progress on association with the EU. Although 
many authors suggest that what truly changed this acrimonious malaise was 
Tuđman’s death in December 1999 and the subsequent electoral defeat of 
his HDZ in January 2000, what changed the EU’s – and Britain’s – approach 
to SEE and Croatia was the Kosovo war in the summer of 1999. The Western 
alliance needed regional support for its intervention against the Milošević 
regime and it bought that support by redesigning the EU’s policies toward 
the region. With the end of NATO operations against Belgrade in June 1999, 
the EU initiated the launch of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. The 
Pact’s Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach famously labeled it as “the fast 
track to full EU membership” (Bechev 2006: 35). And Romania and Bulgaria 
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– whose EU accession process had stalled until their cooperation helped 
NATO in its intervention against Belgrade – received a pledge from Tony 
Blair: “You stood by us, we’ll stand by you” (Binyon 1999).
More importantly, the EU abandoned its Regional Approach in favour 
of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which was supposed 
to deepen contractual relations with individual SEE states based on EU 
criteria of democratisation and market reform (Bechev 2006: 35). In one 
of his last public speeches before passing away, at the summit launching 
the Stability Pact on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo, Franjo Tuđman stayed true 
to himself and pledged Croatia’s opposition to any form of regional 
integration which would repeat the historical errors of Yugoslavia. He also, 
however, called for a clear path to European and international integration 
for all states of the region, to be determined on their own individual merit 
(Tuđman 2009: 219-221). He did not live long enough to see that his view 
prevailed – not that Western diplomats and foreign policy makers would 
have ever admitted that anyway. Their distaste for the Croatian president 
was such that no head of any EU member state or its government came to 
his funeral. As for Britain, Tuđman’s obituaries in the London press labeled 
him “just as ruthless and corrupt, and as guilty of precipitating appalling 
slaughter as his notorious contemporary in Belgrade, the Yugoslav 
President, Slobodan Milosevic” (Times 1999). And British politicians, like the 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, remembered Tuđman – former member 
of Tito’s WWII resistance movement who maintained a rather generous 
view of Tito until the very end – as “the closest I would ever get to talking 
to a real-life European fascist, full of bombast and national superiority” 
(MacShane 2011: 27).
Old policies and new beginnings: EU accession and 
cooperation with the ICTY
At the turn of the century all conditions for a dramatic improvement in 
Croatia’s relations with Britain and the EU seemed to be met. Croatia 
was ruled by a coalition government of six parties under Prime Minister 
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Ivica Račan of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with the HDZ firmly 
in opposition. Tuđman’s successor as the president of Croatia became 
the HDZ dissident Stjepan Mesić who campaigned on the platform of a 
radical departure from his predecessor’s policies. The new government 
announced its clear commitment to a speedy accession into the EU, a 
reversal of Tuđman’s policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as full 
support for the work of The Hague Tribunal. What was equally important, 
the Labour government in London was still riding the wave of its proactive 
European agenda, particularly when it came to foreign policy and 
security. British diplomats were placed into highest international foreign 
policy offices. In October 1999, for example, George Robertson became 
the Secretary General of NATO, and Chris Patten took the post of the 
European Commissioner for External Relations.
When it came to enlargement, there was firm political consensus on the 
need for its real progress among all major UK parties. For Tony Blair, Britain 
supported enlargement because it was not only stabilising the whole 
continent, but also crucial in turning the EU into a global “superpower, 
but not a superstate” (Blair 2000). And for the Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Francis Maude, enlargement was Britain’s “moral imperative” (Crowson 
2007: 104). Once Slobodan Milošević was ousted from power in early 
October 2000, the whole Southeast Europe seemed to be catching up with 
the train of Eastern European enlargement. At a summit in Zagreb on 24 
November 2000, EU member states confirmed the membership perspective 
of SEE states which, in turn, endorsed the principles of the Stabilisation 
and Association Process. At this summit, Croatia started negotiations on 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) – a new form of EU 
association agreement reserved for SEE countries. The optimism in Zagreb 
was such that there was widespread belief Croatia could catch up with 
other Eastern European candidate countries and join the EU within several 
years. This optimism, however, soon proved to be unfounded, largely due 
to Croatia’s steadily deteriorating relations with Britain on account of 
Zagreb’s (lack of) cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.
Relations between the Račan government in Zagreb and the Blair 
government in London, however, seemed to get off to a flying start. 
Already during the electoral campaign in October 1999, Račan and his 
principal coalition partner Dražen Budiša travelled to London to present 
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their post-election platform. In May 2000, Račan chose London as the 
destination of one of his first international visits, where he and his ministers 
met with their British counterparts. And in September of the same year, in 
his role of the president of the Croatian Social Democrats, he travelled to 
the convention of the Labour Party where he again met with Prime Minister 
Blair and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and gave a speech on Croatia’s 
foreign policy. Behind those courteous and encouraging interactions, 
however, there was very little of substance for Račan and his government 
to hold on to. Faced with an extremely dire economic situation – which was 
one of the main reasons why the HDZ lost the elections – Račan needed 
real aid to push through the needed economic reforms. But apart from 
support for Croatia’s membership in the WTO, which finally materialised 
in November 2000, he received nothing of the sort. What he instead did 
receive were enormous pressures which often crossed the boundaries 
of normal diplomatic practice regarding the extremely challenging and 
politically toxic issue of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal.
Although Croatia under Tuđman strongly supported the formation of 
the ICTY, Zagreb’s cooperation with The Hague was at best strained 
during the second half of the 1990s. Tuđman relatively easily succumbed 
to international pressures when it came to extraditing Bosnian Croats 
indicted by the Tribunal, but his government refused to accept the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over Operations Flash and Storm which ended the 
war in Croatia in 1995 (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1124). Primarily due 
to international pressures, the government of Ivica Račan reversed that 
position with a parliamentary Declaration of 14 April 2000 (Zastupnički 
dom 2000) and thus entered into open conflict with the extremely vocal 
coalition of the recently defeated political right and the various veterans’ 
associations. As the Tribunal made progress in its investigations, a politically 
debilitating pattern emerged of recurring media speculation, followed 
by public protests, government defensiveness and internal division, and 
ultimately international pressure. The brittle government stayed united 
and managed to fend off the challenge from the right in February 2001 
after the indictment of General Mirko Norac by a local court for war crimes 
committed against Serb civilians. Five months later, however, when the 
ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte brought sealed indictments against 
generals Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, the governing coalition nearly 
fell apart (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1126-1131).
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Unlike the indictment against General Norac by the Croatian court, these 
indictments presented a far greater problem for the government for several 
reasons. Most obviously, they came from the ICTY, which meant that they 
were part of Croatia’s international obligations and that they thus placed 
the government under the EU’s magnifying glass. Since the government 
of FR Yugoslavia just days earlier extradited Slobodan Milošević to The 
Hague, Zagreb had very little manoeuvring space. More importantly, the 
indictment against General Gotovina carried far more serious charges 
than the indictment against General Norac. In the Gotovina indictment, 
the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor suggested the very nature of Croatia’s 
military operations in the summer of 1995 was not only criminal, but also 
possibly genocidal. Gotovina was alleged to have been part of a criminal 
effort involving President Franjo Tuđman, whose aim was the purging of 
the Krajina region of its Serb population (ICTY 2001). These allegations 
led to a serious cabinet crisis during which four ministers from the SDP’s 
principal coalition partner, Budiša’s Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), 
tendered their resignations. Prime Minister Račan, however, managed to 
hold on to power by winning the parliamentary vote of confidence with 
the argument that Croatia could address the indictment’s allegations 
only through the judicial process at the Tribunal. The outcome of this 
affair, however, was to haunt Croatian politics for more than a decade 
to come. In an act of either incompetence or political short-sightedness, 
Croatian authorities failed to capture General Gotovina who, instead of 
turning himself over to the ICTY, chose to go on the run.
With The Hague albatross around its neck, Croatia continued to make 
slow progress on its road to EU membership. The Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement was signed on 29 October 2001, but its ratification 
was protracted, particularly in Britain which used this process as a form of 
additional pressure on Croatia, ostensibly regarding cooperation with the 
ICTY. When the Croatian government decided to file a legal challenge 
against another ICTY indictment – this time of the former Chief of Staff of 
the Croatian Army, General Janko Bobetko – in the fall of 2002, London 
suspended the SAA ratification process. The Bobetko affair ultimately 
ended in the spring of 2003 with the death of the 84-year-old general, but 
relations between the two countries dipped to a new acrimonious low, to 
some extent also due to particularly vocal critique of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq by some Croatian politicians, most notably president Stjepan Mesić 
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(Jović 2007). Britain, now backed by the displeased Bush administration in 
Washington, further intensified its campaign of pressure on Croatia.
According to a series of media reports in Croatia and the UK, in February 
2003 London compelled the Račan government to consent to an 
intelligence operation led by the British Secret Service ‘MI6’ on Croatian 
territory with the purpose of capturing General Gotovina (Traynor 2005b). 
Although that month Croatia submitted its official application for EU 
membership, its accession was bound to make little progress because the 
SAA ratification was still blocked on account of the ICTY. By agreeing to 
let the MI6 conduct its operation on Croatian territory, Račan hoped to 
persuade London and its like-minded EU partners not only that Gotovina 
was out of the country, but also that Croatia was fully cooperating with 
the Tribunal. This turned out to be a mistake. The operation disturbed the 
whole political and intelligence apparatus in Zagreb, with accusations 
and counteraccusations dominating the media coverage on a daily 
basis. More importantly, MI6 seemed to feed the ICTY Prosecutor Carla 
Del Ponte with information that Gotovina was hiding in Croatia and that 
he was protected by nationalist elements in the state administration.
The British government also continued its effort of equalising Croatia’s 
standing vis-à-vis The Hague with that of Serbia. Even though out of 20 
ICTY indictees still at large in the summer of 2003 only one (Gotovina) 
was from Croatia and the other 19 were Serbs, British diplomats at the UN 
Security Council insisted that the UNSC resolution 1503 from 28 August of 
that year names Gotovina together with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko 
Mladić as the remaining indictees deserving particular attention of the 
authorities (Hodge 2006: 195; Hartmann 2007: 289). The implication of this 
strategy was clear: the alleged crimes of Gotovina were on par with those 
of Karadžić and Mladić, and Croatia was equally culpable as Serbia for 
the lack of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal (Hodge 2008: 418). This 
campaign reached such a level that Prime Minister Račan decided to 
visit London in the midst of electoral campaign in September 2003 to 
lobby his British counterpart Tony Blair for some respite. The Hague Tribunal 
issue “has taken over the relationship with Great Britain,” Račan told the 
media before leaving for London. “Croatia cannot be punished because 
it should have done something that it has not been able to do” (Traynor 
2003). Blair, however, gave him little more than a polite hearing. As Denis 
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MacShane, his minister for Europe, said at the time, Croatia’s “road to 
Brussels leads through The Hague” (Castle 2003). Several weeks later, 
Račan lost the election to the reformed HDZ under the leadership of Ivo 
Sanader, partly due to his government’s policy toward the ICTY.
As expected, the return of the HDZ did not lead to a shift in Britain’s 
position toward Croatia, even though Croatia’s cooperation with The 
Hague Tribunal improved markedly. The perfect case in point came in 
April 2004 after Croatia extradited to the Tribunal two Croatian generals 
– Mladen Markač and Ivan Čermak – accused of crimes associated 
with Operation Storm, as well as six Bosnian Croats accused of crimes 
associated with the Croat wartime entity in BiH, the Croatian Republic of 
Herzeg-Bosnia. The extraditions came concurrently with the decisions by 
the European Commission and the European Council regarding Croatia’s 
status as an official EU candidate country. On 14 April, the Tribunal’s Chief 
Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was asked by the EU to comment on the 
level of Croatia’s cooperation and her report was positive. According to 
the Tribunal’s spokesperson and Del Ponte’s advisor Florence Hartmann, 
however, within twenty minutes of Del Ponte’s report becoming public, 
the British ambassador in The Hague came to her office to express his 
government’s displeasure. Shortly thereafter he was followed by an 
official of the American embassy who chastised the Chief Prosecutor for 
supposedly alienating Serbia by praising Croatia. It is important to note 
that both the United States and Britain were at the time placing significant 
pressure on Del Ponte to refrain from issuing new indictments of Serbian 
officials, supposedly due to fears that the Serbian government after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 was too weak 
to sustain the resulting pressures (Hartmann 2007: 288-291). Britain was at 
the forefront of efforts to shore up Belgrade – as the director of the East 
Adriatic Unit at the Foreign Office, Karen Pierce, said at the time – by “fast-
track[ing] Serbia through some of the EU and NATO mechanisms” (Hodge 
2006: 198).
Due to Del Ponte’s positive report, however, Britain did not block Croatia 
from acquiring the European Commission’s endorsement of candidacy in 
April 2004 and the European Council’s official confirmation of its candidate 
status later that June, likely because it deemed such a move to be 
diplomatically too costly. In December of that year, Britain also failed to 
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fend off Croatia’s supporters on the European Council from giving Croatia 
the provisional date of 17 March 2005 for the beginning of accession 
negotiations (Traynor 2004). In a repeat of the clash regarding Croatia’s 
recognition in 1991, the conflict was once again primarily between Britain 
and Germany. But by March 2005, things changed dramatically. The full 
nature of the MI6 operation in Croatia was exposed by the media and 
one of the surveillance vans its agents were using was burned, probably 
by their local detractors. As a result, Del Ponte’s rhetoric turned strongly 
negative and she reported to the European Council that Croatia was 
actually shielding Gotovina. On the eve of Croatia’s start of accession 
negotiations, its foreign minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović travelled to 
London with evidence of her government’s efforts to locate Gotovina 
and to curb the activities of his local associates, but her British interlocutors 
were unconvinced (Traynor 2005a). London managed to persuade 
enough of its partners on the European Council that Croatia’s accession 
negotiations should be postponed. The British government even advised 
Croatia to suspend its membership application, supposedly to avoid the 
humiliation of postponement, and to resubmit it once there was progress 
on the Gotovina front.
Croatia rejected this advice and six months later the issue of its accession 
negotiations was once again on the agenda of the European Council. 
Britain favoured further delay of Croatia’s negotiations, but its problem 
was that it also wanted the Council to approve the start of negotiations 
with Turkey. The Council was in a heated debate for several days with the 
dividing lines on the status of both countries nearly perfectly overlapped 
– Britain, for example, being the strongest opponent of Croatia and 
proponent of Turkey, and Austria being the strongest proponent of 
Croatia and opponent of Turkey. In a last-minute compromise, however, 
both Croatia and Turkey got what they were hoping for: the official start 
of accession negotiations. With the Council members (especially Britain 
and Austria which publicly announced their seemingly uncompromising 
positions) now facing humiliation themselves, Carla Del Ponte helped 
break the deadlock. She surprisingly submitted a report suggesting 
Croatia was doing everything possible regarding the capture of General 
Gotovina (Browne 2005a). Two months later, in part thanks to the work 
of Croatia’s intelligence services, Gotovina indeed was arrested on the 
Canary Islands and extradited to The Hague. It soon transpired that he 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
26
had not been in Croatia since his flight in 2001, but had instead travelled 
to many other countries, including Argentina, Chile, China, the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Russia, Mauritius, and Tahiti (Guardian 2005). “Those who 
believed us when we were saying that Gotovina was not in Croatia today 
received the final and complete confirmation,” Croatia’s Prime Minister 
Ivo Sanader told the media, while welcoming the arrest (Browne 2005b). 
Neither Carla Del Ponte nor the British government addressed the issue of 
Gotovina’s actual whereabouts during his escape. 
Why did Britain pursue Gotovina so vigilantly and why did it place such 
extraordinary pressure on Croatia, brazenly infringing on its sovereignty 
by insisting that it allow a foreign intelligence service to operate freely 
within its borders? According to various press reports, it is possible that 
the British intelligence service took the Gotovina case personally 
due to his alleged connections with the IRA and its attack on the MI6 
headquarters in 2000 (Rufford and Walker 2004). For some British officials, 
like the former minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, the whole affair also 
seems to have been personal. In his part-memoir, part-diary, part-policy 
booklet published in 2011, MacShane exposed a rather undiplomatic 
distaste for both Gotovina and the late President Tuđman: Tuđman was 
a “latter-day mini-Mussolini”, whereas Gotovina was a “thug” and a “war 
criminal” who had supposedly “awarded himself the rank of ‘General’ 
in Tuđman’s war of ethnic cleansing in Croatia” (MacShane 2011: 27, 71, 
82). After Gotovina’s first-degree verdict of guilty in April 2011, MacShane 
took an unprecedented step and wrote a statement for the Croatian 
media in which he compared Gotovina both to the Nazis and to Stalin’s 
executioners at Katyn (Trkanjec and Muhar 2011). In November 2012, after 
Gotovina’s appeal was successful and he was found not guilty, the former 
British minister remained silent.
Personal animosities aside, however, it is undeniable that the Gotovina 
case and the issue of Croatia’s cooperation with The Hague Tribunal had 
larger strategic implications for Britain’s policy in the region. Putting pressure 
on Zagreb served as a form of legitimation of the process of transitional 
justice in Belgrade, as well as a tool of pressure control on the Serbian 
government. Placing emphasis on Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY in 
international forums had the potential of at the same time removing the 
spotlight off Serbia, and compelling its government to boost its own efforts 
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in extraditing the remaining indictees. More importantly, however, the 
issue of Croatia’s cooperation with The Hague was obviously an extremely 
powerful tool in shaping the future of the region vis-à-vis its relations with 
the EU. This “regionalized” nature of the transitional justice process and 
the strategic give-and-take Britain and other Western powers have 
employed in their relations with Yugoslavia’s successor states are often 
neglected by the literature which tends to present international players as 
rather unidimensional actors largely interested in justice and democratic 
progress in the region (e.g. Subotić 2009; Freyburg and Richter 2010). To 
quote Florence Hartmann, who witnessed the interaction of the Tribunal 
and British diplomats first-hand: “The obvious inconsistency in the policy 
of London, which is ready to make back-room deals for other indictees 
and is less determined to stop the impunity of Karadžić and Mladić than 
Gotovina,…[has] given Britain the chance to slow down Croatia’s entry 
into the EU and to thus give Serbia the chance to make up for its own 
delay, in order to enable Europe to consider the possibility of joint entry 
of the two neighboring countries from the former Yugoslavia into the EU” 
(Hartmann 2007: 291). Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that 
Croatia lost several crucial years on its path toward EU accession due 
to the Gotovina case. As the former EU commissioner for enlargement 
Günter Verheugen said in an interview in September 2008, “Croatia 
would have already been in the EU had one intelligence service of one 
EU member state not driven all of us mad with the stories” of Croatia 
harbouring Gotovina (Palokaj 2008).
True allies at last? Croatia and Britain in the EU
The arrest of Ante Gotovina and the start of Croatia’s EU accession 
negotiations seemed to suggest that relations between Croatia and 
Britain would finally acquire some semblance of normalcy. Behind the 
scenes, however, Britain’s efforts to slow down Croatia’s accession to 
the EU continued. Documents of the US government uncovered in the 
WikiLeaks affair in 2010 give us a glimpse of the extent to which the British 
government was intent on delaying Croatia’s accession by refusing to 
accept the opening of negotiations on the Judiciary and Fundamental 
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Rights chapter of the EU’s Acquis Communautaire on account of Croatia’s 
alleged lack of effort to turn over to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor 
artillery documentation from Operation Storm. According to the report 
of the US Embassy in Zagreb from November 2009, British ambassador to 
Croatia, David Blunt, told his American colleague that “some key officials 
in London regard Croatia as virtually unchanged since the Tudjman 
era and are inclined to assume GOC bad faith in its dealings with the 
ICTY.” He also suggested that a visit from the US officials to London “to 
acquaint senior officials with these realities might offer the only hope for 
a reassessment of the entrenched UK position” (Guardian 2010; Traynor 
2010). While much media attention was given to the blockade of Croatia’s 
negotiations by its north-western neighbour Slovenia because of their 
maritime border dispute, it was exactly the Judiciary and Fundamental 
Rights chapter that was the last to be opened and the last to be closed 
in Croatia’s negotiations with the EU – chiefly due to Britain’s influence on 
the negotiating process. Negotiations were, however, finally completed 
in June 2011 and the Accession Treaty was signed in December of the 
same year. Britain was one of the last countries to ratify it in January 2013, 
though it should be noted that it did so before Croatia’s supposed EU ally 
and protector, Germany.
With Croatia’s EU accession, relations between the two countries entered 
a phase of relative calm. Unfortunately, this phase proved to be rather 
brief. This time the sources of turbulence, however, did not come from 
Croatia or Southeast Europe, but from the UK. The first challenge was 
presented by the Scottish independence referendum held in September 
2014. Although the prospect of an independent Scotland was welcomed 
among some political commentators in Croatia who saw the demise of 
the United Kingdom as karmic punishment for London’s policies, Croatian 
government led by the Social Democrats took a more muted approach. 
In the run-up to the referendum, the Scottish government of Alex Salmond 
was eager to secure support for Scotland’s automatic EU membership in 
case its voters opted for independence. The response from the Croatian 
government of Zoran Milanović – which did not substantively differ from 
the responses of other EU member states – brought a dose of hard reality to 
Edinburgh: “Negotiations with the EU are a process based on consensus. 
All member states have to agree to all decisions related to enlargement. 
Croatia knows all too well the numerous obstacles that could present 
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themselves in each individual case. Croatia stands firmly on the position 
that all states which wish to become members must go through a detailed, 
all-encompassing, carefully thought out, and just process of negotiations” 
(Veljković 2013). As sympathetic as the Croats may have been for the 
cause of independent Scotland, their government did not wish to rock 
neither the UK nor the EU boat.
Referendum fever in the UK, however, soon continued with the Brexit 
campaign. It would be generous to say that the short-lived coalition 
government of Tihomir Orešković had any real position toward the two 
possible outcomes of the Brexit referendum. How could it have had, 
considering how divided and weak it was, and considering how little its 
opinion would have mattered to both the UK voters and the remaining EU 
partners? It greeted the shocking referendum result with regret, labelling it 
as the “greatest strike against the unity of Europe from the very beginning 
of its integration, and for us a particularly sensitive issue at a time when 
enlargement to our neighbouring nations is worked on” (Vlada 2016a). 
Prime Minister Orešković’s statements were a bit more revealing. Orešković 
invoked the “globalization trilemma” proposed by the economist Dani 
Rodrik (2000) (which states one cannot have a completely integrated 
common market, national sovereignty, and democracy) to argue 
against deeper integrative efforts. “A change is necessary,” Orešković 
stated. “The Union needs to change to be able to resolve the issues which 
are driving discontent and scepticism, like the issue of transparency of 
decision making in Brussels” (Vlada 2016b).
Of course, if one wanted to get a real feel for the pulse of Croatia’s 
political class regarding Brexit, one did not have to listen to Orešković. 
His government suffered a resounding vote of no confidence just days 
prior to the UK referendum. Three weeks after the Brexit vote, the senior 
coalition partner HDZ ousted its unpopular president Tomislav Karamarko 
and installed a new leadership under Andrej Plenković. Plenković, who 
was a career diplomat before joining the HDZ in 2011, was a member of 
the European Parliament at the time. His view of Brexit was substantively 
different from Orešković’s. Gone were the calls for change and recognition 
of the EU’s democratic deficit. Instead, Plenković focused on David 
Cameron’s strategic error of succumbing to the populists and calling for 
an “unnecessary” referendum which turned a crisis within his own party 
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into a crisis of national, European, and global significance (Hina 2016). 
Plenković’s statements were particularly interesting since he was already 
in campaign mode for the leadership of his own party. He was signalling a 
clear break with his more nationalist predecessor who found role-models 
in Orbán’s Hungary or Kaczyński’s Poland.
Indeed, as Plenković stated to the Croatian Television in response to a 
question regarding whether Croatia should get closer to the Visegrád 
Group in post-Brexit EU, “I believe we must be strongly pro-European 
because that is a project which will last despite the current crisis. If we 
give way to the forces that wish to water it down, I think that will make the 
whole continent much less relevant globally, and that would be a step 
back for us in terms of both economic performance and values” (HRT 
2016). For Plenković and his government sworn in on 16 October 2016, 
Brexit could easily become Britain’s new “original sin” if it jeopardizes the 
future of the EU. In that they probably differ little from a whole generation 
of pro-EU politicians on the continent. Whether Brexit does jeopardise the 
future of the EU, however, is still anybody’s guess. UK Prime Minister Theresa 
May in her 17 January 2017 speech announcing her government’s plans 
for hard Brexit wanted to assuage Europe’s fears: “The decision to leave 
the EU represents no desire to become more distant to you, our friends 
and neighbors. It was no attempt to do harm to the EU itself or to any of 
its remaining member states” (Independent 2017). Brexit negotiations will, 
however, present the real test of this claim, as will Britain’s relations with 
the Trump administration in Washington whose commitment to European 
integration is suspect at best. These issues will determine the near future 
of Britain’s relations not only with Croatia, but also with the rest of the EU.
Conclusions
Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s relations with Britain were 
undoubtedly its greatest foreign policy challenge since independence. 
Despite their clear power disparity, however, relations between the 
two countries were not driven by Britain’s preferences and Croatia’s 
adaptation to them – on the contrary. Croatia pushed for and achieved 
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independence – against Britain’s wishes. It secured its territorial integrity 
and ultimate victory in the war for independence – against Britain’s 
wishes. It successfully navigated through the Scylla and Charybdis of 
EU negotiations and became a full member state before the rest of the 
region – also against Britain’s wishes. A relatively small European state 
defied one of the greatest European powers and managed to achieve 
virtually all of its foreign policy aims. This is a cautionary tale for many 
scholars of international relations and EU politics committed to theoretical 
approaches which privilege state power capabilities over all other 
factors. Small states are not simply the objects of great power politics, but 
can shape their own and their regions’ destinies independently. However, 
how do we explain Britain’s policy activism when it comes to Croatia 
and its region? Why did a small and seemingly inconsequential country 
in Southeast Europe generate such interest and policy commitment from 
one of Europe’s great powers?
Judging by Ambassador Blunt’s candid comment regarding his superiors 
in Whitehall, perhaps the root of it all was in historical oversimplification 
– one error British policy makers have a strong tendency to make (Hill 
1988: 24). Foreign Office, for example, in its online profile for Croatia until 
recently claimed that, “The roots of Croatia’s traumatic emergence 
as an independent state in the 1990s date back to the Second World 
War (and even further). Its more recent history was strongly influenced 
by Slobodan Milošević, who came to power in the former Yugoslavia in 
1989. Slovenia and Croatia, both then federal states within Yugoslavia, 
became disillusioned with the speed of economic and political reforms 
under his leadership. By January 1990 they had set themselves on the 
path to independence” (FCO 2012). Setting aside the highly problematic 
first sentence of that passage and its clumsy wording, the factual and 
interpretational absurdity that Milošević was a reformer who came to 
power in Yugoslavia in 1989 and that Yugoslavia apparently fell apart 
because Slovenia and Croatia were not comfortable with the speed of 
his reforms clearly suggests that the Foreign Office does not have a merely 
oversimplified view of what happened in former Yugoslavia – it seems to 
have no clue.
Foreign Office’s historically inaccurate view of the breakup of Yugoslavia 
is, however, more important for another reason. It reveals that Whitehall still 
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lays the bulk of blame for Yugoslavia’s dissolution on the federation’s north-
western republics and not on Serbia. In the eyes of London, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia – the starting point for the two countries’ discordant relations 
– was Croatia’s “original sin”. This is not to say that Britain’s policy toward 
Croatia over the past two decades has been some sort of vendetta for the 
demise of what British diplomats were in 1991 calling “our baby” (Glaurdić 
2011: 374). London’s actions were obviously guided by the events on the 
ground, Croatia’s own democratic deficit, the limitations of diplomacy in 
a multilateral environment, the perception of British interests in the region, 
and by the general reluctance of the UK public to support EU enlargement. 
In a national survey conducted on the eve of Croatia’s EU accession, for 
example, only 10% of UK respondents stated they wished to see Croatia 
join the EU, with overwhelming majorities opposing further enlargement on 
account of its supposed negative effect on unemployment, immigration, 
terrorism, and EU decision making (YouGov 2012). Britain’s actions toward 
Croatia were also, however, embedded in a particular kind of “historical 
thinking” about Southeast Europe and in a long tradition of thought about 
British policy in this region. British historical biases regarding Croatia were 
likely reinforced with that realist conception that “only a strong Serbia can 
ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans.”
These factors were important determinants of Britain’s relations with 
Croatia until Croatia’s entry into the EU. Recent events, however, have 
profoundly altered the game, making it difficult to predict how the 
relations between the two countries will develop in the years to come. 
Ironically, the failures of EU policies – to a significant extent crafted by 
Britain – during the Yugoslav wars, and Britain’s use of the EU accession 
process as a tool of pressure on Croatia, have made the Croatian public 
and political elite less Europhile and more Atlanticist, which would have 
meant that Zagreb and London could have become true allies within the 
EU on a number of crucial policy fronts – from the Union’s relations with 
the United States to the EU eastward enlargement or even the process of 
deepening of economic integration.
Rather than future collaboration on the pace of EU reforms or enlargement 
in Southeast Europe, however, they will now be preoccupied with questions 
of Britain’s exit from the EU. Croatia is unlikely to have great influence on 
that negotiating process, although consensus within the EU will be needed. 
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Croatia, and all other remaining EU member states, will however shape 
their relations with the UK based on the evolution of British policy toward 
the pace and direction of future EU integration. Prime Minister May was 
eager to reassure its EU partners that Britain will remain a friend of the 
European Union and a pillar of European security. It remains to be seen 
whether those words will translate into actual policy, or if London will be 
swayed toward who knows what kind of destabilising policy coming from 
Washington and/or Moscow in the near future. In other words, challenges 
to Europe’s geopolitical status quo might once again be the principal 
bone of contention between Croatia and Britain, though this time with 
one crucial difference: Croatia will be in, and Britain out.
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